The most widely used economic models of social preferences are specified only for certain outcomes. There are two obvious methods of extending them to lotteries. If we do so by expected utility theory, so that the independence axiom is satisfied, our results imply that the resulting preferences do not exhibit ex ante fairness. If we do so by replacing certain outcomes with their expected utilities for each individual, so that individual risk preferences are preserved, then ex ante fairness may be preserved, but neither the independence axiom nor ex post fairness is satisfied.
Introduction
If people have both a preference for fairness and continuous preferences, they are willing to make a small sacrifice for a more egalitarian outcome. One way to create "fairness" in an ex ante sense is to flip a coin and reverse the roles. The use of lotteries to allocate indivisible rewards and costs (such as the draft lottery) is evidence that ex ante fairness is often a concern. There is also considerable experimental evidence that agents care about ex ante fairness, see for example, Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels [2005] , Krawcyck and le Lec [2006] , Bolton and Ochenfels [2009] and Kircher et al [2009] . We show that there is a conflict between ex ante fairness and the independence axiom. In particular, we point out that five leading theories of outcome-based social preferences for fairness, those of Fehr and Schmidt [1999] , Bolton and Ockenfelds [2000] , Charness and Rabin [2002] , Cox and Sadirij [2004] , and Andreoni and Miller [2002] all fail to reflect concerns for ex ante fairness because they are expected utility theories. 1 One contribution of this paper is the formulation of very weak notions of ex ante fairness that are clearly inconsistent with the independence axiom. We conclude that no theory that incorporates a reasonable notion of ex ante fairness can maintain the assumption of expected utility. Our results are a formalization and generalization of examples and results from the social choice literature, starting from the Diamond [1967] / Machina [1989] example of a parent or social planner who strictly prefers to use a coin flip to allocate an indivisible good to two (other) agents and thus violates the axioms of Harsanyi [1955] . The social choice literature, which adopts Harsanyi's "impartialobserver" viewpoint, has responded to this example by relaxing independence in various ways. 2 The conflict between independence and ex ante fairness has also been noted in the behavioral literature, for example Kircher et al [2009] give a verbal argument indicating that ex ante fairness is inconsistent with utilitarianism, and implicitly with the independence axiom.
1 This note studies only such outcome-based or "consequentialist" theories, as opposed to those that allow payoffs to depend directly on the beliefs and intentions of others, as in Rabin [1993] . 2 For example Karni and Safra [2002] make use of only a partial version of independence in their study of the use of lotteries to solve indivisibility problems. Grant et al [2010] also recognize this when they reconcile the Diamond paradox with Harsanyi's social choice theory: they do so by means of a social
To formalize the insight in the various past examples and experiments, we give formal and fairly weak definitions of fairness, using only the domain of "coin flip" lotteries. We consider both "fairness for you" -a willingness to sacrifice my payoff for your benefit -and "fairness for me" -a willingness to reduce your utility to achieve higher utility for me. Our first point is that if either of these holds in a very weak form ex ante then the independence axiom must be violated. As a consequence, if social preferences over deterministic allocations are extended to lotteries by treating the associated utility functions as expected utility, ex ante fairness is violated both for you and for me.
We also show that transitive, state-independent preferences that are consistent with a well defined notion of individual risk preference over own consumption necessarily violate a weak form of ex post fairness. This is true, for example, for FehrSchmidt preferences extended to lotteries by replacing money income with expected money income. More generally, preferences that depend only on the expected value of individual utilities, such as those in Grant et al [2010] , may be ex ante fair, but cannot be ex post fair. More generally, none of the standard models of fairness and social preference used in experimental research and their obvious extensions to lotteries can incorporate both ex ante and ex post fairness. There are however relatively straightforward variants of these models that do reflect both concerns. We conclude that experimental research on social preferences should pay more attention to preferences over lotteries, and that decision theorists should then consider what classes of tractable preferences are broadly consistent with the resulting data.
Ex Ante Fairness for You and For Me
There are two players who we refer to as "me" and "you." We consider certain outcomes 2 ( , ) m y + ∈ ℜ that can be interpreted as money for me and money for you. We also consider simple lotteries generated by tossing a fair coin with equal 50% probability of H(eads) or T(ails). We call this a coin flip and it can be written as Notice that since the role of the two certain prospects may be reversed, the same holds for the indifference relationship. Any expected utility theory -that is preferences induced by a utility function linear in probabilities -must satisfy Axiom 1, and some non-expected utility theories satisfy the axiom as well. It is weaker than the usual independence axiom, in the sense that it needs to hold only for fair coin flips; in particular since prospect theory models do not distort the probabilities { 0,1/2,1} they satisfy this axiom. 4 On the other hand at an intuitive level it is clear that the axiom conflicts with the idea that people might prefer lotteries that are ex ante fair.
The most immediate conflict between the independence axiom and fairness comes from an ex ante version of fairness, so we start from that. Below we show there is also a contradiction between independence and ex post notions of fairness under the standard continuity assumption.
To motivate our definition of ex ante fairness, suppose the agent weakly prefers (8, 5) to the more egalitarian (7, 7), and strictly prefer the fairer coin-flip lottery ((1000, 0),(7, 7)) to the less fair ((1000, 0), (8, 5) ). Then the next Axiom is satisfied, regardless of preferences over other lotteries.
Axiom 2 [Ex Ante Fairness for You]:
There is a 2
This says that there is a sacrifice to make you better off that I would not make when comparing two deterministic outcomes, but I would make the sacrifice in the context of a coin flip if the other outcome is sufficiently less fair for you. Proof: Axiom 1 asserts that there can be no parameters such that the conditions in Axiom 2 hold; while Axiom 2 asserts the existence of some parameters, so the contradiction is immediate.
Remark
In particular Example 1 violates the independence axiom.
Ex ante fairness for me is just the flip side of ex ante fairness for you. 
This says that there is an opportunity to enrich myself at your expense I would not take, but I am concerned about ex ante fairness for me in the sense that I would exploit it in the context of a coin flip if the other outcome is "sufficiently less fair" for me.
For the same reason as Axiom 2, Axiom 3 is a transparent violation of independence.
Theorem 2: There are no preferences satisfying Axioms 1 and 3.
Economic Models of Social Preference
We now discuss four different social preferences from the literature that reflect a concern for fairness. 6 Each of them describes choices under certainty. One method of extending them to uncertainty is to treat them as expected utility functions, and evaluate lotteries by their expected value; in this case Axioms 2 and 3 must be violated. As we will see, alternative extensions to uncertainty, such as replacing lotteries over income with the expected value of income, run in to different problems.
Fehr and Schmidt
The Fehr and Schmidt [1999] social preferences, in our notation, are given by
are getting more than me I dislike it, and if I am getting more than you, I also dislike that, although not as much as I dislike you getting more than me. Although Fehr and Schmidt do not explicitly say this, it is implicit from their discussion and analysis that this is an This creates a bias in my favor, so that, in particular "fairness to me" may satisfied even as I am unconcerned about "fairness to you".
Bolton and Ockenfels
The Bolton and Ockenfels [2009] preferences are given by
where v is second differentiable and it is increasing and concave in the first argument, and concave with a maximum at ½ in the second argument.
Here my utility depends on my share of the total as well as the amount of money I implies a willingness for me to pay to reduce your income. This is one possible notion of fairness, but not one required in our axioms.
The remaining preferences we discuss are monotone and not egalitarian.
Charness and Rabin
The Charness and Rabin [2002] preferences are given in our notation by
to say, they are a weighted average of my money income, the least income either of us have, and the social total. It is the dependence on the least income of either of us that gives rise to a concern for fairness. Naturally if we extend these preferences to uncertainty using the independence axiom Axioms 2 and 3 must fail. On the other hand the extension using expected money payoffs violate independence since min( , ) Em Ey ɶ ɶ obviously does so. Cox and Sadiraj [2004] specify preferences that depend on who is getting more in a non-linear way. In our notation, their preferences are given by 
Cox and Sadiraj
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Ex Post Fairness and Risk Preference
The models discussed in the previous section specify social preferences only over certain outcomes and are representable by means of a utility function. If we extend preferences to lotteries by taking the expected utility the independence axiom is necessarily satisfied, and so very weak notions of ex ante fairness for both you and me must fail. As we noted, an alternative procedure for extending preferences to lotteries is to replace certain income with its expected value. This allows for ex ante fairness, while the expected-utility extension does not. However, this method of relaxing independence does not allow for ex post fairness, and more broadly any preferences that have well defined risk preferences for me do not allow ex post fairness. This says that for some lottery the more egalitarian coin flip where we are both better off at the same time is preferred to the less egalitarian coin flip where our fates are opposite.
For example, given a choice between (1,1, 0, 0) and (1, 0, 0,1) many people might prefer
(1,1, 0, 0) . This captures the common observation that "misery likes company" as well as ideas of status competition and relative consumption. Taking, say, the Fehr-Schmidt preferences, and extending them to lotteries using expected income, allows for ex-post fairness but has the perhaps undesirable implication that agents are risk neutral; we next examine the extent to which a concern for ex post fairness is consistent with (a) well defined notions of risk aversion and (b) a concern for ex ante fairness. This says that if we hold fixed the outcomes for you, then my risk preferences are independent of the particular outcomes you are assigned, in effect I have well-defined preferences over lotteries for me that are independent of what the lotteries give to you.
One example of preferences that satisfy Axiom 5 is the utility representation obtained by Grant et al [2010] for an impartial observer: consistent with a descriptive model of social preferences, as it rules out any concern for ex post fairness.
More generally, any preferences with a utility representation of the form 
(Notice that this reduces to the original utility function for deterministic outcomes.)
Recall that Axioms 2 and 3 involve strict preference and we already showed ( , ) U Em Ey ɶ ɶ satisfies Axioms 2 and 3 for 0 α > . It follows that for γ sufficiently small, ( , ) U m y ɶ ɶ must also satisfy Axioms 2 and 3. Axiom 6 is obviously satisfied, so we shall show that 
Conclusion
Our first point is that the independence axiom is inconsistent with even very weak notions of ex ante fairness. Existing models of fairness do not focus on the role of lotteries, and the preferences analyzed in Fehr and Schmidt [1999] , Bolton and Ockenfels [2009] , Charness and Rabin [2002] , Cox and Sadiraj [2004] and Andreoni and Miller [2002] are defined for certain outcomes, without specifying how they are to be extended to lotteries. As we have seen, there are two obvious ways of making the extension. We can do so by treating the certainty utility as a Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, in which case the independence axiom is satisfied, but then ex ante fairness for both me and you are violated. Or the preferences can be extended by replacing the certain individual utility with its expected value, in which case the independence axiom is violated. In the later case, for example, in the social welfare theory of Grant et al [2010] , not only is independence violated, but ex post fairness is ignored. Hence our second conclusion: the standard models of fairness and social preference used in experimental research and their obvious extensions to lotteries do not incorporate both ex ante and ex post fairness. As we have seen, it is relatively straightforward to construct preferences that do satisfy both conditions, in part because we deliberately formulated very weak notions of fairness to make the impossibility results more sharp.
